Daniel K. Bannor & 74 Others v Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) & Another

Judgment

p. 1Source page 1IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL KUMASI, GHANA

CORAM:

KWAMINA BAIDEN, JA (PRESIDING) DR. ADUSEI, JA ABATURE, JA CIVIL APPEAL NO: H1/033/2026

DATED: 2ND JULY 2026

DANIEL K. BANNOR & 74 OTHERS -PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS

VRS. 1. KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY - DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (KNUST) 2. THE FINANCE OFFICER/DIRECTOR, KNUST COYAT LF APPEAL JUDGMENT

Dr. Poku Adusei, JA:

The paramount issue for consideration in this appeal is whether ex-gratia or end of service benefits paid upon retirement was amenable to tax deductions. The plaintiffs/appellants (hereinafter, referred to as plaintiffs) worked with the 1st defendant/respondent (hereinafter referred to as 1st defendant or university) for decades, and were paid severance packages upon retirement from the services of the university. The severance payments or retirement benefits were twofold: pensions on the one hand and ex-gratia or end of service benefits on the other. The instant dispute therefore turned on what the parties described in their pleadings as ex gratia or end of service benefits paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants wrongly and unlawfully deducted taxes from the amounts paid to them as ex-gratia as per their Unified Conditions of Service for Unionised Staff of the Public Universities of Ghana. The said conditions of service

p. 2Source page 2document, tendered as Exhibit 'G', is at pages 293 to 330 of the Record of Appeal (ROA). In search of a remedy, the plaintiffs took out a writ of summons, with an accompanying statement of claim, against the defendants for: i. A declaration that the tax deductions made from plaintiffs' pension benefit (ex-gratia) is wrong and unlawful since same is contrary to the provisions of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana and the tax law/Act of Ghana. ii. An order of the honourable court compelling the defendants to make full refund of the tax deductions made from the pension benefits (ex-gratia) of the plaintiffs. ili. An order of the honourable court compelling the defendants to pay interest on the wrong [sic] and unlawful tax deductions. iv. Costs including legal fees. The defendants resisted the plaintiffs' action. They contended that per the applicable law, ex-gratia or end of service benefit payable to a retiring employee was taxable, and that it is only pension which is tax-exempt. The defendants asserted that the payments made to the plaintiffs were not pension entitlements, but rather one-off end of service payment made to the employees upon retirement. The plaintiffs filed a reply and joined issues with the defendants. The following issues were then set down for determination by the trial court: i. Whether or not the tax deductions made from the plaintiffs' pension benefits (ex-gratia) [was] wrong [sic] and unlawful contrary to the provisions of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana and the tax law/ Act of Ghana. il. Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to the full recovery or refund of the tax deductions made from their pension benefits (ex-gratia). Three additional issues were filed by the defendants: (1) Whether or not payments made by the defendants to the [appellants] were end of service benefits (ex-gratia) or pension. (2) Whether or not the defendants were mandated by Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), the statutory body responsible for ensuring maximum compliance with tax laws, to make tax deductions from end of service benefits (ex-gratia) of retiring staff. (3) Whether or not the plaintiffs have any cause of action against the defendants The trial court, upon assessment of the evidence and in consideration of the law, dismissed the plaintiffs' action. First, the trial court struck out the 2nd defendant/ respondent (hereinafter referred to as 2nd defendant) as a party to suit. The court reasoned that the 2nd defendant could not be held personally liable for the performance of his official duties as an officer of the 1s' defendant and that the plaintiffs' suit did not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the 2nd defendant. Secondly, the

p. 3Source page 3trial court held that ex-gratia or end of service benefit, unlike pension, was amenable to tax deductions in accordance with the law. Grounds of Appeal The plaintiffs are aggrieved by the decision of the trial court and have appealed against it to the Court of Appeal. The stated grounds of appeal were that: (1) The trial court erred when it held that at the time of the retirement of the plaintiffs, their end of service or ex gratia awards were taxable income. (2) The court erred when it held that the practice-note of the Commissioner-General was binding on the plaintiffs. Based on the above stated grounds of appeal, the plaintiffs prayed this court to set aside the judgment of the trial High Court delivered on 5 July 2024. Determining the appeal By way of preliminary comments, the grounds of appeal placed before this court did not include the omnibus ground of appeal which would have clothed this appellate court with the same jurisdiction as the trial High Court to re-hear the whole case. The plaintiffs in the instant appeal limited themselves to two grounds, namely, that an end of service benefit (ex-gratia) was not taxable under the law; and, that the trial court erred in the manner it applied the practice-note of the Commissioner-General in arriving at its decision. By their two stated grounds of appeal, the appellants did not, prima facie, challenge the findings of the trial court that the payments made by the defendants to the plaintiffs constituted end of service benefits (ex-gratia) and not pensions. Indeed, the pleadings and the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion reached by the trial court to the effect that there was a clear dichotomy between end of service benefits (ex-gratia) and pension payments. By the provisions of section 96 of the Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896) (as amended) and section 211 of the National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766), pensions are mandatory statutory contributions made by the employer and the employee for the provision or future provision of retirement payments. In the context of this case, whereas pension payments are made periodically to the plaintiffs, the payment of ex-gratia to each of the plaintiffs was one-off upon retirement from the university. The conditions precedent for a staff to qualify for pension and/or ex-gratia differ as well. To qualify for pensions, an employee should have worked and contributed to the Ghana Universities Staff Superannuation Scheme (GUSSS) or the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) for a minimum period of fifteen (15) years. In the case of ex-gratia payments, the Unified Conditions of Service for Unionised Staff of the Public Universities of Ghana, tendered as exhibit 'G', provides that the employee should have worked for at least ten (10) years to receive such one-off payment upon retirement.

p. 4Source page 4Taken that no stated ground of appeal was invoked in the instant appeal against the trial court's determination of the distinction between ex-gratia and pensions, the arguments in the written submission advanced by the plaintiffs to assail the trial court's conclusion on that issue were inadmissible. The appellants cannot argue grounds that were not formulated as part of their grounds of appeal. And any further discussion of the dichotomy between ex gratia and pension would be aimed at elaborating the stated grounds of appeal. In this wise, the Supreme Court has underscored the relevance of the grounds of appeal in Brown v. Quarshigah [2003-2004] SCGLR 930 in holding (1) thus: "(1) the expression 'an appeal is by way of re-hearing' meant that the jurisdiction of the appellate court was available but the rule of practice in the courts was that the appellant must invoke it by filing appropriate grounds of appeal, distinguishing the so-called omnibus ground, namely, that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence at the trial, from misdirection or errors of law, challenge to jurisdiction or capacity, etc." Furthermore, the submission by learned counsel for the plaintiffs challenging the trial court's determination that the 2nd defendant was not a necessary party to the suit should not be entertained in the instant appeal. On the issue of joinder or misjoinder of a party vis-à-vis the nature of the reliefs claimed, the court ought to be satisfied that, first, the 2nd defendant was a necessary party, i.e., one whose presence would lead to an effectual and complete adjudication of the matters in controversy before the court; or one whose exclusion would see aspects of the cause or matter unadjudicated upon. See In re Presidential Election Petition (No.1); Akufo-Addo & 2 Ors v. Mahama & 2 Ors [2013) SCGLR 1 at 7, Baffoe-Bonnie JSC (as he then was] dissenting; Sam (No.1) v. Attorney General [2000] SCGLR 102 However, in consonance with the natural justice principle of audi alteram partem, the re-hearing of a matter on appeal must be circumscribed by the stated grounds of appeal, unless there are just and compelling reasons to accommodate deviations from those grounds. In the instant case, without any indication in the grounds of appeal that the plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the conclusion reached by the trial court that the 2nd defendant was not a necessary party, it would be unfair and unjust to entertain the plaintiffs' contention in their written submission that the 2nd defendant was a necessary party to the suit. As an aside, there was also no indication in the record of appeal that the 2nd defendant was a juristic person within the statutes of the university, with the requisite locus standi to sue and be sued. The averment in the statement of claim and the evidence merely described the 2nd defendant as "the finance officer (head of finance) of the Ist defendant." Pursuing an office at the university with no indication of its juristic persona was an overreach. The body whose participation might have better aided the trial court in adjudicating the matters in controversy was the Ghana Revenue Authority. After all, the 1st defendant conceded that the disputed tax deductions made from the plaintiffs'

p. 5Source page 5ex-gratia payments went to the Ghana Revenue Authority. See Audio-Visual Rights Society of Ghana v. Fiesta Royale Hotel [H1/88/2023] CA delivered on 11 May 2023. Against the backdrop of the above preliminary comments, we proceed to address the two grounds of appeal seriatim. Ground (1): Whether ex-gratia payments or end of service benefits are taxable In arguing the instant appeal, learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the tax deductions made by the 1st defendant from their ex-gratia payments were wrongful and contrary to the provisions of the 1992 Constitution and Act 896. According to the plaintiffs, the payment of ex-gratia formed part of their conditions of service; ex-gratia is payable to a retiring employee who has served for a continuous period of at least ten (10) years at the university. That being so, the plaintiffs urged this court to reverse the trial court's decision that ex-gratia was taxable. The plaintiffs further contended that there was no provision in Act 896 that specifically mentions ex-gratia or end of service benefits as taxable income. The plaintiffs relied on an aid to construction of statutes expressed in the Latin maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (i.e., the express mention of one or more things of a particular class may be regarded as inferentially excluding all other members of the class, and contended that if Parliament wanted to make ex-gratia taxable, the legislature would have stated so expressly. In other words, the express stipulations of taxable income from employment under Act 896 excluded by implication ex-gratia. Accordingly, the plaintiffs concluded that Act 896 was inapplicable to the payment of end of service benefits (ex-gratia) whatsoever. In response to these arguments, the 1st defendant demurred and insisted that the law mandated the university to levy tax on the ex-gratia payments made to the plaintiffs. The 1st defendant asserted that Act 896 was applicable to the payment of end of service benefits to the plaintiffs, and cited provisions of section 4 of Act 896 and the Income Tax Regulation, 2016 (LI 2244) to buttress their case. The trial court, in answer to similar submissions, reasoned as follows: "From section 4(2)(a)(i) [of Act 896], gratuities are included in the calculation of an assessable income of an individual for a year of assessment. In view of the fact that ex-gratia, per the definition, is a gratuitous payment, ex gratia can be considered as a taxable income under this provision. Furthermore, section 4(2)(a)(vi) provides that a retirement payment received in respect of an employment is part of a person's assessable income. Ex-gratia payment is a form of retirement payment received in respect of an employment as per exhibit G, it is paid to retiring employees of the 1st defendant institution who have served the 1st defendant institution for ten years or more. Per section 4(2)(a)(vi) of Act 896, such payment is considered as taxable income."

•€gURT OF APPEA -KUMASI

p. 6Source page 6In the result, the trial court delivered itself thus: *I therefore hold that end of service benefit or ex-gratia payment is a taxable income under our laws. The 1st defendant as a tax entity is therefore under an obligation to deduct the relevant tax from all ex-gratia payments being paid to its retired or retiring employees. The 1st defendant in making the said deductions in the nature of tax from the ex-gratia payments of the plaintiffs did not breach the provisions of any law; neither did it breach any provision of the Constitution of Ghana. The 1st defendant however in doing so duly performed its legal obligations as stipulated in Act 896 and it cannot be faulted on that." In the instant appeal, it is understandable why the plaintiffs have voiced concerns about the trial court's determination that the ex-gratia payments made to them under their unified conditions of service was gratuitous. The Latin translation of ex-gratia as 'out of goodwill' or "as a favour' contributed to obfuscate the real meaning of the end of service benefits paid to the plaintiffs. The impugned description of the plaintiffs' ex- gratia as gratuitous payments by the trial court was a misnomer; ex-gratia per the plaintiffs' conditions of service (i.e., exhibit 'G') were entitlements that accrued to the plaintiffs under their employment contracts. The benefits were thus earned by the plaintiffs through years of dedicated services at the university. Nevertheless, that false description by the trial court should not detract from the true position of the applicable law on taxable employment income. That said, the crux of the instant dispute bordered strongly on matters of law and not necessarily what the parties even presented as their evidence. It will therefore be worthwhile to set out in some detail the relevant statutory provisions cited by the parties in support of their respective positions. Article 199(3) of the Constitution, 1992 provides that: "The pension payable to any person shall be exempt from tax." Section 4 of Act 896 provides that: "Section 4 - Income from Employment 4. (1) The income of an individual from an employment for a year of assessment is the gains and profits of that individual from the employment for the year or a part of the year. (2) A person who is ascertaining the profits and gains of an individual from an employment for a year of assessment or for a part of that year shall (a) include in the calculation, an amount specified in respect of (i) salary, wages, leave pay, fees, commissions, and gratuities; (ii) overtime pay and bonuses as provided by Regulations;

p. 7Source page 7(iii) personal allowances, including cost of living allowance, subsistence, rent, entertainment or travel allowance; (iv) a discharge or reimbursement of an expense incurred by an individual or an associate of the individual; (V) a payment made for the individual's agreement to conditions of the employment; (vi) subject to section 94, a retirement contribution made to a retirement fund on behalf of an employee and a retirement payment received in respect of an employment; (vii) other payments, including gifts, received in respect of the employment; (vili) other amounts required to be included under Part III; and (ix) any other allowance or benefit paid in cash or given in kind if they are derived by the individual during the year from the employment; and (b) exclude from the calculation, an amount specified in respect of (1) an exemption under section 7; (ii) a final withholding payment; (iii) a discharge or reimbursement of an expense incurred by an individual on behalf of the employer of that individual that serves the proper business purposes of the employer; (iv) a discharge or reimbursement of the dental, medical or health insurance expenses of an individual where the benefit is available to each full-time employee on equal terms; (v) a payment providing passage of the individual to or from the country in respect of the first employment of that individual by the employer or termination of the employment where the individual (a) is recruited or engaged outside the country; (b) is in the country solely for the purpose of serving the employer; and (c) is not a resident of the country; (vi) a provision of accommodation by an employer carrying on a timber, mining, building, construction, farming business or petroleum operations to that person at a place or site where the field operation of the business is carried on or as prescribed by Regulations; (vii) a payment made to employees on a non- discriminatory basis and which by reason of the size, type and frequency of the payments, are

p. 8Source page 8unreasonable or administratively impracticable for the employer to account for or to allocate to an individual; and (vill) redundancy pay. (3) For the purposes of this section, an amount, allowance or benefit is a gain or profit from employment, if the amount, allowance or benefit is provided (a) by the employer, an associate of the employer or a third party under an arrangement with the employer or the associate of the employer; (b) to an employee or an associate of the employee; and (c) in respect of past, present or prospective employment." (emphasis supplied) Section 7(1)(d) of Act 896, exempts pension from tax as follows: "Section 7 - Exemption Amounts (1) The following are exempt from tax... (d) pension..."

Section 94(2)(a) of Act 896 stipulates that: "Taxation of retirement funds

(2) Retirement contributions received by a retirement fund are (a) exempt from tax; and (b) not to be treated as consideration received for an asset or liability of the fund."

Section 127(1)(a)(b)(d) of Act 896 empowers the Minister responsible for Finance to make Regulations to give effect to the provisions of the Act. It was pursuant to this legal mandate that LI 2244 was passed in 2016. Regulation 3(1) of LI 2244 provides that: "Employers required to withhold tax 3(1) In accordance with these Regulations, an employer shall withhold appropriate tax from qualifying cash payments to an employee during a year of assessment to meet the employment tax liability of that employee for that year." The National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766) further excludes benefits payable under the three-tier pension schemes upon retirement from tax. Section 89 of Act 766 stipulates that:

"Exemption from tax 89(1) Tax is not payable by an employee in respect of contribution towards retirement or pension schemes under this Act. (2) Tax is not payable on the benefits received under this Act.

p. 9Source page 9(3) The social security scheme and any existing scheme under this Act is approved scheme for ascertaining the chargeable income of a person for making the appropriate deductions under the income tax law, and income tax shall not be paid by an employer in respect of a worker on contributions which do not exceed thirteen and one half per centum of that person's total salary." A common thread that runs through the above statutory provisions is that pension contributions are not taxable in Ghana. They are considered to be retirement contributions. Under section 96 of Act 896, retirement contribution means "a payment made to a retirement fund for the provision or future provision of retirement payments." Such retirement contributions fall under the three-tier pension schemes established under Act 766; they provide retirement income for workers and are administered by SSNIT and other trustees of registered schemes under the auspices of the National Pensions Regulatory Authority (NPRA). From the provisions of Act 896, ex-gratia or end of service benefits, other than pensions, are caught squarely within the province of the law as taxable income from employment. First, ex-gratia falls within the contours of taxable income from employment under section 4(2)(a)(v) of Act 896; it is a payment made for the individual's agreement to conditions of the employment. Secondly, ex gratia is a retirement payment received in respect of an employment pursuant to section 4(2)(a)(vi) of Act 896 and for which no exemption is provided under section 94 of the same law. Thirdly, and most importantly, ex-gratia is an income or gain in respect of past employment under section 4(3)(c) of Act 896. By way of elaboration, the imposition of tax on income, allowances and benefits covers past, present and prospective employment benefits, gains and profits. An ex-gratia payment made to an employee upon retirement, be it voluntary or compulsory, falls within the category of benefits from past employment, which is taxable under the law. In the instant case, ex-gratia payments made to the plaintiffs was under the conditions of the employment for university staff. Similarly, the plaintiffs' ex-gratia constituted payments received in respect of an employment. Therefore, the plaintiffs' contention that ex-gratia was tax-free on the basis of the Pensions Act was misplaced. Ex-gratia is not pension and does not fall within the three-tier mandatory pension schemes operated under the laws of Ghana. Ex gratia is not admınıstered by SSNIT; neither was it administered by any of the registered pension trustees. Therefore, if there was any law which was inapplicable to the instant case, it was the pensions law cited by the plaintiffs. Then again, the plaintiffs' reliance on the expressio unius rule produced some inconsistencies in their arguments: in one breath, the plaintiffs' case was that the deduction of taxes from their ex-gratia payments was contrary to Act 896. In another breath, the plaintiffs contended that Act 896 was not applicable to their case whatsoever. The first scenario implicates an express exemption in Act 896 that could

p. 10Source page 10possibly vindicate the plaintiffs' assertion that ex-gratia was not taxable, whereas the second scenario dealt with an absolute lack of any statutory provision in Act 896 on ex-gratia or end of service benefits in Act 896. The plaintiffs' resort to the expressio unius rule did not do justice to the formidable provisions of Act 896 which clearly made end of service benefits (ex-gratia) taxable. It is for this reason that Date-Bah JSC in the case of Asare v. Attorney General 2003- 2004] SCGLR 823 at 833 admonished us to be mindful that the rules of interpretation are non-binding on the courts in the same way as the ratio decidendi of a case. Equally, the maxims of interpretation serve as guides or aids to judges in deciphering the true meaning of words used in a statute in order to give purport to the legislation. In the instant case, the categories of taxable income from employment under sections 4(2)(a) and 4(3)(c) of Act 896 were lost on the plaintiffs. See Maunsell v. Olins [1975] 1 All ER 16 at 18 HL, Lord Reid. From the judgment, the trial Judge limited himself to the second juridical classification of taxable income from employment pursuant to section 4(2)(a)(vi) of Act 896, but same cannot found a basis to reverse his decision. The array of income or benefits from employment that are amenable to tax under the law are bountiful. The trial judge's decision was therefore supported by the provisions of Act 896. Ex gratia or end of service benefits formed part of the plaintiffs' conditions of employment agreement. It qualified as an income or benefit from past employment other than pension. That being the case, the ex-gratia or end of service benefits paid to the plaintiffs was not sanctioned under the national pensions law; neither was it sanctioned under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The payment rather formed part of the conditions of service of the plaintiffs under exhibit 'G'; that payment thus arose from contractual arrangements between the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant. Such contractual arrangements for the payment of money to employees upon severance from employment fall within the province of Act 896, specifically sections 4(2)(a)(v)(vi) and 4(3)(c) of Act 896. Conflating matters of ex-gratia payment with pension is what has led the plaintiffs to mount the instant appeal. In the circumstances, we hold that the 1st defendant rightly levied the taxes on the plaintiffs' income from their past employment. The 1st defendant complied with the requirement of the law and breached no conditions of employment under which the ex-gratia was paid to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, ground one of the instant appeal fails. My next and final task is to address the second ground of the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal. Did the trial judge wrongly apply the practice-note of the Commissioner General of the Ghana Revenue Authority?

Ground (2): Whether the trial court erred in its application of the practice-note of the Commissioner General

It could be said that having found that the deduction of taxes from the plaintiffs' ex- gratia payments was sanctioned by law, any argument by the plaintiffs against the

p. 11Source page 11practice-note of the Commissioner General was of little or no relevance. In legal parlance, we say the preceding expositions under the first ground have rendered the second ground of appeal otiose. But, for the sake of precedential relevance, the plaintiffs' second ground of appeal must be addressed.

The plaintiffs' contention under the second ground of appeal was that the trial court erred by relying on the practice-note of the Commissioner-General of the Ghana Revenue Authority to dismiss their claims. According to the plaintiffs, since the phrase 'end of service benefit' or 'ex-gratia' was not expressly stated in Act 896, any practice note published pursuant to the law was inapplicable to their case. Therefore, the trial court's application of the practice-note to the plaintiffs' case was erroneous.

Contrariwise, the learned counsel for the 1st defendant contended that the trial court reached the right conclusion when it held that the plaintiffs' income from employment was taxable. According to learned counsel for 1s the defendant, the practice note was an interpretive tool that ensured consistency in the application of the law. He added that the practice note provided procedural and practical mechanisms for tax assessment whilst addressing deficiencies within the Act.

The question is how did the trial court treat the application of the impugned practice- note? The trial judge delivered himself as follows:

"Though per paragraph 2(3) of the Seventh Schedule, the practice note is not binding on persons affected by Act 896, the interpretation put on the taxability of ex gratia by the Commissioner-General is consistent with the import and intendment of Act 896 some of which have been discussed above in this judgment." Page 446 of ROA

From the above conclusion of the trial court, no where did the judge state that the practice-note of the Commissioner-General was binding on the plaintiffs. The rendition of the trial court was to the effect that the practice note was not at variance with the provisions of the law when it comes to the levying of tax on employment benefits. It is therefore not accurate for the plaintiffs to contend in this appeal that the trial court adjudged the practice note as binding on the plaintiffs.

It is provided under paragraph 2 of the Seventh Schedule to Act 896 thus:

"Practice note

2(1) To achieve consistency in the administration of this Act and to provide guidance to persons affected by this Act and the officers of the Authority, the Commissioner-General may issue practice notes setting out the interpretation placed on provisions of this Act by the Commissioner-General.

(2) A practice note is binding on the Commissioner General until revoked.

p. 12Source page 12(4) A practice note is not binding on persons affected by this Act."

From the tenor of the above statutory provisions, even though a practice note is made pursuant to the provision of the law, its utility lies in it being used as a guide to the interpretation of Act 896. A practice note serves merely as a guide to tax and customs administration. As a guide, a practice-note duly enacted by the Commissioner General serves as a servant and not a master of the law. See Asare v. AG (supra). In this wise, the trial court did not breach any principle of law in the manner of its treatment of the practice-note of the Commissioner-General passed pursuant to the tax law. Ground two of the instant appeal also fails. On the basis of the reasoning (supra), this appellate court finds no reason to reverse the decision of the trial court. The plaintiffs in this appeal failed to convince this court that the trial court misdirected itself on the tax law. The 1st defendant rightly levied the taxes on the end of service benefits paid to the plaintiffs upon retirement from the university. The appeal therefore fails and same is accordingly dismissed. No orders as to costs.

DR. POKU ADUSEI, JA (JUSTICE OF APPEAL)

PATRICK KWAMINA BAIDEN, JA I agree: (JUSTICE OF APPEAL)

I also agree: ALI BABA ABATURE, JA (JUSTICE OF APPEAL)

LEGAL REPRESENTATION: WILLIAM KUSI ESQ, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS NENE AHUMA KORDA ESQ, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS /RESPONDENTS