MSL Business School verified Ghana tax case

James Afedo Foundation & James Kofi Afedo Esq. v Attorney-General, Commissioner-General, Ghana Revenue Authority & Speaker of Parliament

The Supreme Court upheld a preliminary objection and dismissed a challenge over taxes on menstrual-hygiene products because no real constitutional interpretation or enforcement issue had been established. The tax merits were not finally determined.

Published by MSL Business School through TaxLawGH.

CourtSupreme CourtDecision3 June 2026Tax periodChallenge commenced in 2023 under Act 878, Act 903 and the former VAT Act, 2013 (Act 870); judgment delivered after the 2023 and 2025 VAT reformsResearch statusPrimary court document reviewed

Authority in context

Read the decision for the proposition the court actually resolved.

The decision is important for the jurisdictional discipline required in constitutional tax litigation and for the limits of judicial remedies affecting taxation and the Consolidated Fund. Its underlying VAT dispute is historically bounded: Act 1107 zero-rated locally manufactured sanitary towels, and the Value Added Tax Act, 2025 (Act 1151), effective 1 January 2026, retained zero-rated treatment for locally manufactured sanitary towels. The decision does not establish that imported and locally manufactured products receive identical treatment, or that the merits of every menstrual-product tax are constitutionally settled.

Parties

plaintiffs: James Afedo Foundation,James Kofi Afedo Esq.
defendants: Attorney-General,Commissioner-General, Ghana Revenue Authority,Speaker of Parliament

Tax topics

Constitutional tax litigation
VAT
Excise duty
Customs classification
Public finance

Material facts

The plaintiffs invoked articles 2(1) and 130 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. They challenged what they described as 20% excise duty and 17.5% VAT on menstrual-hygiene products and alleged sex or gender discrimination and interference with economic, educational and health-related rights.
The reliefs extended beyond declarations. They sought refunds with interest into a proposed Menstrual Justice Trust Fund, an injunction against collection, and a perpetual prohibition on the Executive and Parliament even proposing, discussing or considering discriminatory taxes on menstrual-hygiene products.
The defendants raised a preliminary objection that the cited constitutional language was clear, that the pleadings disclosed no genuine interpretation or enforcement dispute, and that taxation and exemptions were matters assigned principally to Parliament under article 174.
GRA disputed the plaintiffs' premise that the products attracted 20% excise duty and pointed to the Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Act 1107), which had introduced a zero rate for locally manufactured sanitary towels.
The Court examined the constitutional foundation, the evidential particularity of the pleaded challenge, the scope of the requested remedies and the public-finance provisions governing taxation, the Consolidated Fund and withdrawals from it.

Questions before the court

Whether the plaintiffs had properly invoked the Supreme Court's exclusive original jurisdiction under articles 2(1) and 130 by identifying a real question of constitutional interpretation or enforcement.
Whether the pleaded material established a sufficiently particularised constitutional inconsistency in the taxation or classification of menstrual-hygiene products, rather than a disagreement with social and economic policy.
Whether the Court could grant reliefs that would effectively create or dictate tax exemptions, restrict future tax policy, or direct public revenue and refunds into a privately proposed fund.
If jurisdiction existed, whether the challenged tax treatment contravened the equality, non-discrimination, work, education and unenumerated-rights provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs.

What the court held

The cited constitutional provisions did not present an ambiguity, rival meaning or conflict requiring interpretation, and the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a real constitutional enforcement issue on the pleaded facts.
Assertions about the incidence, classification and discriminatory effect of the taxes were not supported with the particularised factual and policy material necessary to overcome the presumption of constitutionality.
The requested exemption, perpetual prohibition and refund-to-private-fund orders were incompatible with the constitutional allocation of tax and public-finance powers to Parliament and the Executive.
The preliminary objection therefore succeeded and the action was dismissed without an order as to costs.
Because the case ended on the jurisdictional objection, the Court did not finally adjudicate a free-standing merits proposition that every tax on menstrual-hygiene products is constitutionally valid.

Ratio decidendi

The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is not engaged merely because a claimant cites constitutional rights while disputing tax or social policy. The claimant must identify a real issue of constitutional interpretation or a clearly particularised inconsistency requiring enforcement. Where the pleaded case rests on disputed assumptions and conjecture and the remedies would require the Court to create tax exemptions, control future fiscal policy or redirect Consolidated Fund revenue contrary to articles 174, 176 and 178, the Court will decline jurisdiction and dismiss the action.

Obiter

The Court made broader observations about the economic and social-policy functions of taxation, the distinction between users and purchasers, locally manufactured products, and alternative hygiene products. Those observations formed part of the jurisdictional reasoning but should not be enlarged into a final merits holding on gender equality or the ideal design of menstrual-product taxation.
The Court reiterated that legislation carries a presumption of constitutionality and that alleged invalidity must be pleaded and proved with sufficient particularity rather than supposition.

Order

Preliminary objection upheld; the case dismissed; no order as to costs.

Separate opinions

None recorded. Mensa-Bonsu JSC delivered the judgment signed by all seven members of the panel.

Procedural history

The plaintiffs commenced an original-jurisdiction constitutional action in 2023. The parties filed a joint memorandum of issues on 4 November 2024. The Supreme Court determined the defendants' preliminary jurisdictional objection on 3 June 2026 and dismissed the action.

Later treatment

No subsequent judicial treatment was identified in the official and public sources checked to 20 July 2026. The judgment is a recent final decision of the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction; absence of a located reconsideration or consequential order is not proof that none exists.

Current-law relevance

Legislation considered

Constitution, 1992, articles 2(1), 17(1)-(3), 24(1), 25(1), 33(5), 37, 40(c)-(d), 130, 174, 176, 178 and 295
Excise Duty Act, 2014 (Act 878), as amended by the Excise Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 2015 (Act 903)
Value Added Tax Act, 2013 (Act 870) and Value Added Tax Regulations, 2016 (L.I. 2243)
Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Act 1107)

Scope and source notes

GRA disputed the pleaded 20% excise-duty premise. Because the action ended on the preliminary objection, the Court did not finally determine the customs or excise classification of every menstrual-hygiene product.

MSL Business School research layer

Detailed TaxLawGH analysis

A structured reading of the verified facts, issues, reasoning, result, later treatment and limits of the decision.

What kind of decision this is

This is an original-jurisdiction Supreme Court decision on a preliminary objection, not a tax assessment appeal and not a final merits judgment validating every tax that may affect menstrual-hygiene products.
That classification controls how the case should be cited: its strongest authority concerns when constitutional tax litigation properly belongs before the Supreme Court and what remedies the Court may grant.

The claim and its evidential foundation

The plaintiffs connected alleged excise duty, VAT and customs treatment to equality, work, education and inherent-rights provisions. They asserted a combined tax burden and discriminatory effect but did not supply the policy record, product segmentation or evidence that the Court considered necessary to test those propositions.
GRA disputed the central 20% excise-duty premise and distinguished locally produced goods. The unresolved factual premise was material because constitutional enforcement cannot be built on an assumed tax incidence.

Why original jurisdiction failed

The Court applied the established Akosah line: interpretation requires imprecision, ambiguity, rival meanings, a conflict between provisions or an institutional conflict that must be resolved. The constitutional text cited here did not present such a problem.
Although clear constitutional language may still support an enforcement action, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate a sufficiently concrete inconsistency. The Court found the pleaded case conjectural and insufficiently particularised.

The public-interest human-rights distinction

The judgment reviewed the High Court's article 33 role in enforcing personal Chapter Five rights and the Supreme Court's ability to entertain a genuinely public-interest enforcement action under article 2(1).
The case was not dismissed simply because it invoked equality or other rights. It failed because, even on the public-interest footing, the Court found no real interpretation or enforcement issue established by the pleaded facts.

Taxing power, exemptions and institutional limits

Article 174 assigns the imposition, waiver and variation of taxation to legislation and, where relevant, parliamentary approval. The Court regarded a judicially created product exemption and a perpetual ban on future fiscal discussion as an intrusion into legislative and executive responsibility.
The reasoning does not make tax policy immune from constitutional review. It requires a properly evidenced constitutional breach and a remedy that respects the constitutional distribution of fiscal powers.

Refunds and the Consolidated Fund

The proposed order directing historic tax receipts and interest into a privately proposed Menstrual Justice Trust Fund conflicted with articles 176 and 178, which govern where public revenue is paid and when money may be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund.
This aspect is independently significant: even a public-interest objective does not permit the Court to bypass the constitutional machinery for custody, appropriation, withdrawal and accountability of public money.

Holding, broader observations and limits

The binding disposition is that the preliminary objection was upheld and the action dismissed for want of a real constitutional interpretation or enforcement issue. No costs were awarded.
Comments about purchasers, product grades, alternative hygiene products and the protective functions of taxation should be read in context. They are not a substitute for a merits holding on whether a differently pleaded and evidenced tax measure could violate equality or another constitutional guarantee.

Current-law position and responsible use

The pleaded VAT framework was Act 870. Before judgment, Act 1107 introduced zero-rating for locally manufactured sanitary towels. Act 1151 replaced the former VAT framework from 1 January 2026 and official GRA guidance continues to describe locally manufactured sanitary towels as zero-rated.
For a present transaction, identify the product, origin, customs classification, supply date and current Act 1151 treatment. Use Afedo principally for jurisdiction, pleading, proof, separation of powers and public-finance remedies—not as a current rate table.

Practical research points

State precisely whether the claim concerns import duty, excise duty, VAT or another levy; do not treat a customs tariff band as though it were automatically an excise-duty rate.
Identify the exact constitutional inconsistency and support it with product, incidence, comparator and policy evidence rather than general assertions about burden or fairness.
Explain why the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is engaged under the Akosah criteria or through a concrete public-interest enforcement issue.
Frame relief that a court can constitutionally grant; tax exemptions, future fiscal policy and withdrawals from the Consolidated Fund engage articles 174, 176 and 178.
Separate the ratio and order from the judgment's broader policy observations, because the action ended at the preliminary-objection stage.
For current advice, begin with Act 1151 and the product's origin and classification; the historical Act 870 dispute is not a present-rate statement.

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This case brief forms part of MSL Business School’s maintained legal-research resource for Ghanaian tax law.